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Recent Social Intuitionist work suggests that moral judgments are intuitive (not based
on conscious deliberation or any significant chain of inference), and that the reasons
we produce to explain or justify our judgments and actions are for the most part post
hoc rationalizations rather than the actual source of those judgments. This is consistent
with work on judgment and explanation in other domains, and it correctly challenges
one-sidedly rationalistic accounts. We suggest that in fact reasoning has a great deal
of influence on moral judgments and on intuitive judgments in general. This influence
is not apparent from study of judgments simply in their immediate context, but it is
crucial for the question of how cognition can help us avoid deleterious effects and
enhance potentially beneficial effects of affect on judgment, action, and cognition itself.
We begin with established work on several reactive strategies for cognitive control of
affect (e.g., suppression, reappraisal), then give special attention to more complex sorts
of conflict (“extended deliberation”) involving multiple interacting factors, both affective
and reflective. These situations are especially difficult to study in a controlled way,
but we propose some possible experimental approaches. We then review proactive
strategies for control, including avoidance of temptation and mindfulness meditation
(Froeliger et al., 2012, this issue). We give special attention to the role of slow or
“cool” cognitive processes (e.g., deliberation, planning, and executive control) in the
inculcation of long-term dispositions, traits, intuitions, skills, or habits. The latter are
critical because they in turn give rise to a great many of our fast, intuitive judgments.
The reasoning processes involved here are distinct from post hoc rationalizations and
have a very real impact on countless intuitive judgments in concrete situations. This
calls for a substantial enlargement of research on cognitive control, drawing on work in
developmental psychology, automatization, educational theory, and other fields.
Keywords: intuition, reasoning, decision neuroscience, affect, neurosciences
It seems obvious that on occasion people make impulsive judg-
ments or decisions and live to regret it. What to do about this
is less obvious, but traditionally common sense and philosophy
have agreed that reason offers some hope: “think it over before
you decide,” “look before you leap.” Most people are inclined
to think that reasoning, if given half a chance, can help us rec-
ognize some impulses or intuitions as foolish and others as
sound. We can then give due weight to sound intuitions and
use various means to counter the force of foolish ones. But does
reasoning actually have this much influence? Recent work by
“Social Intuitionists” on decision-making and moral judgment in
particular (Haidt, 2001; Greene, 2007) suggests that almost every-
body, almost all the time, exercises moral judgment via quick,
intuitive (non-deliberative), “hot” (affect laden) processes. The
reasons people produce to explain or justify their moral judg-
ments are for the most part post hoc rationalizations, and not
the actual basis or cause of those judgments. There are excep-
tions, but these are scarce in everyday life and as a rule restricted
to people specifically trained to think through moral judgments,
conflicts or dilemmas. The same holds in many domains: peo-
ple often cannot give coherent explanations of their judgments or
actions at all, yet cling to those judgments nonetheless [see Mills
and Keil (2004) for experimental evidence]. The real explana-
tion for their inability to produce a coherent, defensible account
is that their judgments are not based on reasoning, but are
intuitive and the result of processes not available to conscious
reflection. This is the basic Social Intuitionist picture of moral
judgment.
Our view is that although there is much truth in this pic-
ture, there is also much left out. Above all it underestimates the
causal influence of slower, controlled cognitive processes on affect
and emotion on at least three fronts: first, reactive strategies for
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control of impulse, intuition, or emotion; second, proactive mea-
sures to avoid unwanted impulses from arising in the first place,
to prepare for coping with them if they do arise, or to actively
arouse affect that might in turn have enhanced effects on action or
cognition; and third, proactive inculcation, (re)shaping, or elim-
ination of the underlying bases of many of our fast, intuitive or
“gut” responses. These bases include character traits, habits of
perception, expertise of various sorts, dispositions to intense gut
reactions such as disgust, and others. In this third area we also
review interesting new work on mindfulness meditation and its
influence on the downstream effects of emotional processing.
In the larger picture we see these causal roles for reasoning as
part of a general theory of cognition/affect interaction that incor-
porates rather than contests recent work by Social Intuitionists.
Our reservations about Social Intuitionism have to do not with
the claim that most of our moral judgments are intuitive, but that
it takes too narrow a view of the potential role of reasoning in gen-
erating or shaping those intuitive judgments, hence in influencing
them for better or worse.
REACTIVE REGULATION OF AFFECT AND EMOTION
STRATEGIES FOR COGNITIVE CONTROL
There are several experimentally established reactive strategies for
cognitive control, including suppression, distraction, distancing
(adopting a third-party view of a conflict), and reappraisal of
a conflict situation, especially of the option favored by impulse
or intuition (see the reviews by Ochsner et al., 2002; Kim and
Hamann, 2007; Goldin et al., 2008). We focus here on reappraisal.
The object of an intuitive or impulsive response—for exam-
ple, my next cigarette—may initially appear to me as a source
of pleasure (“Satisfying, and they are mild!”). But if I am try-
ing to quit smoking I can consciously reappraise the cigarette
as a “coffin nail,” or think of smoking as a “smelly, obnoxious
habit.” Reappraisal is pervasive in advertising, political campaigns
(Lakoff and Johnson, 1980) and elsewhere, and often plays a
role in moral decision-making. Social Intuitionists would rightly
point out that reappraisals frequently amount to rationalizations.
At times these rationalizations can be quite self-serving: “If I don’t
take over Joe’s old job (after Joe has been unjustly fired) someone
else will; so I might as well do it.” In fact I may already intend to
take the job. But in light of my self-serving rationalization, tak-
ing the job appears not as acquiescence or participation in an
injustice, but as something that is for all practical purposes harm-
less. And my refusing the job now appears not as a protest against
injustice but as a pointless sacrifice on my part. I may well even
believe that these rationalizations explain and justify my taking
the job, when in fact the real explanation is simply that I am an
opportunistic cad.
Reappraisal is not limited to internally generated rationaliza-
tions, however. As Social Intuitionists point out, (re)appraisal
often works by means of one person triggering a gut or intu-
itive response in someone else. Thus, an anti-abortionist displays
a photo of a 6-months-old fetus to a freedom-of-choice advocate:
“Abortion until the last trimester allows the killing of a living crea-
ture such as this.” This may stimulate a new gut reaction and a
different intuitive moral judgment. But we suggest a major addi-
tion to this characterization of the new judgment as “intuitive.”
For the strategy of showing such photos, or of erecting billboards
graphically depicting the internal ravages of smoking, may itself
have been well-researched, long-planned and executed, by epi-
demiologists, statisticians, social activists, publicists, legislators,
and so on. The end result may well be a fast, non-deliberated,
affect laden reaction on someone’s part—or millions of such
responses if a campaign of public education is widely success-
ful. But these automatic, intuitive reactions are to a significant
extent the causal effects of previous slow, controlled processes of
thought and planning. Thus for the purpose of discovering how
reasoning might influence affect, impulse, or intuitive judgment,
it is crucial to go beyond the fact that a given response considered
in its immediate context is fast and intuitive rather than deliber-
ated. This holds whether or not people are aware of how their own
intuitions were shaped.
Recent work on reappraisal indicates that people who use
this strategy more frequently also use it more effectively (Cohen
et al., 2012). This result raises further questions for investigation,
including that of whether people can through practice improve
their ability to use this strategy. Interestingly, Kanske (2012, this
issue) finds that “temperament trait effortful control” correlates
with “enhanced (task-relevant) emotion-induced facilitation of
conflict processing,” and that this translates to the neural level.
Given this, along with Cohen’s et al. (2012) suggestive results,
research into the plasticity and educability/trainability of temper-
ament trait effortful control could lead to methods of improving
this important ability in “normals” and perhaps methods of
addressing individual or group deficiencies.
Further, if people can through practice improve their ability
to use reappraisal effectively, can they eventually automatize it,
so that it becomes “second nature”? These questions could in
fact be pursued in the case of any strategy for cognitive control.
And clearly they bring the study of cognitive control into contact
with work on individual differences in ability, on habit or skill
acquisition, and on the shift from conscious control and prac-
tice to automatic activation [see Logan (1988) on two competing
psychological models of automatization]. A related question for
further investigation is whether one can improve in the use of a
given strategy by mental rehearsal (i.e., via imaginative simula-
tion of anticipated situations of decision or action) as one can
with many motor skills (see Gunaratana, 2002; Lutz et al., 2009).
Regarding neural underpinnings, it would be particularly
interesting to know whether the system of executive control
involved in the practice or application of reappraisal was the same
in different domains. Does it differ, for example, depending on
whether the process to be cognitively controlled is itself psycho-
logical (as in cognitive control of affect or of unwanted thoughts),
or physical (as with consciously monitored practicing in sports
or music)? Comparison of research on cognitive control of affect
with results in other domains would bear also on the question
of whether or not there is a single, general-purpose system of
executive control, and if so, how it relates to domain-specific
systems of cognitive control. Indeed, accumulating neuroscience
evidence indicates that executive control functions are not imple-
mented within a unitary system but may instead reflect the oper-
ation of multiple information processing systems (Koechlin et al.,
1999, 2000; Miller and Cohen, 2001; Braver et al., 2003; Sakai
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and Passingham, 2003; Curtis and D’Esposito, 2004; Braver and
Barch, 2006; Crone et al., 2006; Dosenbach et al., 2006; Koechlin
and Summerfield, 2007; Barbey et al., 2012).
This brings us to an example of contemporary research with
the kind of broad scope we think necessary in the long run.
Posner et al. (2008) investigate the genetic and neural basis of a
human executive attention network. More specifically, their work
combines recent developments in genetics, fMRI, and behavioral
testing to track the development of an attentional network in early
childhood. The neural systems involved coincide with results of
fMRI studies of cognitive control in adults, at least insofar as
it includes anterior cingulate cortex and portions of lateral pre-
frontal cortex; for reviews see Botvinick et al. (2001), Miller and
Cohen (2001), Ramnani and Owen (2004), Barbey et al. (2009),
and Barbey and Patterson (2011). The experimenters also corre-
lated their results with parental reports of children’s ability for
self-regulation of cognition and emotion. One long-range goal
was to investigate the role of genes and experience in the emer-
gence of this network in 4-year-olds, and how it might constitute
a general foundation for acquiring a series of more specific skills
during early school years. From our point of view such a net-
work would be an important element also in the development and
exercise of any of the strategies for cognitive control surveyed so
far. This would be particularly important if ways were found to
systematically strengthen such a system of executive attentional
control, whether in children or adults.
Finally, the case of reappraisal already suggests ways in which
psychological and neuropsychological research itself can make
important if indirect contributions to direct practical efforts at
cognitive control in concrete circumstances. These potential con-
tributions include (1) discovering or verifying experimentally
the efficacy of a given strategy for cognitive control; (2) eval-
uating experimentally the pros and cons of different strategies
(e.g., the potential undesirable “rebound” effect of suppression
(Wegner et al., 2004); (3) exploring the effectiveness of differ-
ent strategies with respect to control of different types of affect
(e.g., anger management, stress reduction, curbing one’s enthusi-
asm); (4) exploring the possible plasticity and educability of the
ability to use a given strategy; (5) investigating individual and
group differences with respect to capacities for control (Kanske,
2012, this issue), along with possible ways to address deficiencies
[e.g., in very young or old populations; see esp. Braver (2012)];
(6) testing methods by which different strategies might be taught,
learned, practiced, and even perhaps routinized so they them-
selves become second nature. Cognitively controlled research in
all these areas can potentially discover effective means of cognitive
control and explore possibilities for helping children and adults
improve their ability to exercise particular strategies of control.
COGNITIVE CONTROL IN EXTENDED DELIBERATION
The strategies for control surveyed so far treat conflict between
reasoning and affect as a simple one-on-one encounter. But
when a decision is important and an agent has the time,
and the cognitive and imaginative resources to think things
through, the factors involved canmultiply quickly. This “extended
deliberation” predictably produces a mix of reasons and intu-
itions/impulses/emotions on both sides of the question. (By
“extended deliberation” we mean roughly a process of identifying
and weighing all the significant pros and cons pertaining to a par-
ticular judgment or choice—or at least, the significant factors an
agent can find by making an honest and unhurried but not clin-
ically obsessive effort.) Extended deliberation typically includes
multiple forms of interaction among those various factors, and
multiple points in time at which these interactions occur. In addi-
tion, different factors and interactions may well engage different
neural mechanisms if different specific forms of cognitive control
come into play. Extended deliberation is more difficult to study,
either behaviorally or via neuroimaging, than specific, “one-on-
one” control strategies. After analyzing the process a bit further
we will venture some suggestions about how it might nonethe-
less be approached empirically. For present purposes we will look
more closely at deliberation arising from a conflict between one’s
“better judgment” and an affective impulse, but bear in mind that
it can also arise from conflict between affective impulses, or even
from conflicting reasons.
Reasoning recruiting affect
One frequent feature of extended deliberation is the recruitment
of supporting affect by reasoning. When we try to think of the
reason(s) in favor of or against some judgment or action we ordi-
narily think of the consequences that would or would not ensue,
depending on whether or not we performed the action. These
consequences are typically valenced—i.e., they include positive
or negative affect. A common mechanism for the evocation of
affect is the imaging or mental simulation of actions and their
likely consequences (Aristotle and Barnes, 1984; Barsalou, 1999).
Do we go to the birthday party as promised, or do we accept
the free tickets to the ball game we were just unexpectedly given?
Suppose we have an emotional impulse to go to the ball game (it
is a “big game” against our arch-rival) and don’t really want to
go to the party anyway (last year’s was extremely boring). On the
other hand, we ought morally speaking to attend the party, not
only because we said we would, but also based on the imagined
responses of other attendees—their delight if we show up, their
disappointment if we do not. Other emotionally valenced con-
siderations then naturally present themselves, e.g., the shame or
guilt we would feel if we broke our promise, or the guilt we would
feel at disappointing the hostess, who has always treated us well.
So already the option favored by moral reasoning has recruited
two “rational” considerations (“a promise was made and must be
honored”; “you shouldn’t mistreat someone who has treated you
well”), but also a variety of emotionally charged scenarios to bol-
ster those rational factors and to counter our emotional impulse
to go to the ball game. Real-life extended deliberation will usu-
ally be more complex still, since the initial gut response will also
recruit both affect and reasoning to its cause.
In a nutshell, in extended deliberation both (or all) sides of
a conflict will recruit both affect and “cooler” considerations.
Moreover, as deliberation develops over time, opposing factors
will interact: although some newly recruited factors will be sim-
ply additional considerations meant to add cumulative force to
one side or the other, some will be direct responses to consider-
ations advanced on behalf of the opposing viewpoint while still
others will be replies to those responses.
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Scanners in the fog of war
These are not mere possibilities, but facts of life when an indi-
vidual, a pair of agents such as a married couple, or a group of
people must think through a difficult decision, trying to iden-
tify and evaluate the pros and cons of various possible options.
These cases raise an obvious problem for the use of brain imaging
studies to address the question of the possibility and manner of
interaction between affect and cognition. The problem is not just
the perennial one of whether and how one can make a clear cut
distinction between affective and cognitive processes. The further
problem is that even if we are able to determine during actual
deliberation that one sort of underlying neural system or struc-
ture (e.g., dorsolateral prefrontal cortex vs. amygdala) shows a
greater increase in activity at a given time than the other, this
will not tell us which particular reasons or which affects actu-
ally account for the observed increase in activity (for a review, see
Dolcos et al., 2011). After all, there will be both sorts of factors
on both (or all) sides. Moreover, heightened activity in either the
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex or the amygdala might well reflect
more than one simultaneous process of cognition or feeling.
Future research into these matters might well begin by using
experimental material suitable for extended deliberation, prefer-
ably issues that people actually do deliberate and debate. Then
keep a running, temporally fine-grained self-report record of con-
scious steps of deliberation while the underlying brain activity
is being recorded. Recent work on social interaction suggests a
promising variant on the usual one-participant-at-a-time setup:
include two participants, each in a scanner and each able to
communicate with the other via keyboard and screen as they
discuss some question that is of actual concern to them (for
a review of the technique and some of its technical problems,
see Montague et al., 2002). Comparison of sufficiently precise
neuroimaging data with real-time records of deliberation could
potentially throw light on some—though probably not all—of the
questions listed in the previous paragraph.
Among the many additional questions raised by extended
deliberation we mention only the most fundamental of these,
and note that it applies also to the simpler cases of cognitive
control reviewed above under “Reactive Regulation of Affect
and Emotion.” Can reasoning itself have causal or motivational
force, for example in countering affect or impulse, or must it
arouse/recruit affect in order to have such influence? On the sur-
face extended deliberation appears to pit reasons against reasons,
affect against affect, and reasons against affect. We tend to think
of valenced affect as itself motivational. But are we to think of
“rational considerations” as possessing some kind force or weight
in and of themselves?
Philosophers have debated this question for centuries, but
today it may at least in part be addressed empirically. Relatively
simple cases of control such as reappraisal or distraction might
already shed light on the issue, for in each type of cognitive con-
trol one could ask whether its conscious exercise involves arousal
of affect in its own support. Neuroimaging evidence would be
critical, since it could in principle reveal activity in affective sys-
tems even if an agent did not report any conscious experience of
affect arising in support of the initial “cooler” side of the con-
flict. It would be important also to compare successful attempts
at control with unsuccessful ones, to see whether they correlated
systematically with greater or lesser activity or some change in
patterns of activity in affective systems. As usual, however, mat-
ters quickly growmore complicated. Should consciously felt effort
at control be counted as affect—e.g., exerting “will power” in the
face of temptation, or “maintaining resolve” through a prolonged
effort? If so, is the feeling of exerting effort the sort of affect that
reasonmust rely on if it is to have causal influence on judgment or
behavior? If so, how (neurally speaking) does reasoning summon
this sort of exertion? On the other hand, would reasoning not in
fact have to have some other source of influence in cases where
we do not experience any feeling of effort? Or do we then postu-
late unconscious effort and look for neural underpinnings? Along
the same lines, if people can through practice become better at
using a particular strategy of control should we not predict that
they will with increased mastery be able to exercise greater control
with less effort? There are many more related questions awaiting
investigation, but since this paragraphwas supposed to formulate
“just one,” we will leave off here, and turn to proactive strategies
for control.
THINKING AHEAD: PROACTIVE COGNITIVE CONTROL
PREVENTATIVE MEASURES
In everyday experience it is not necessary to be entirely reac-
tive with respect to emotion. [We borrow the terminology of
“reactive” and “proactive” from (Braver, 2012), but give it much
broader application.] As Aristotle pointed out (Aristotle and
Barnes, 1984), people are often aware of their own susceptibilities
and weaknesses, and they can take reasonable steps to avoid sit-
uations that are likely to arouse unwanted impulses or thoughts.
An alcoholic may avoid drinking parties, or take one route home
rather than another to avoid passing directly by the corner tavern.
A quite different means of control is described in a very recent
pilot study of the effects of mindfulness meditation on emotion
and cognition (Froeliger et al., 2012, this issue). Experimental
results suggest that although practitioners exhibit limbic reac-
tivity to negative emotional stimuli, this reactivity appears not
to have the usual downstream effects on later mood states.
Especially interesting is the authors’ finding concerning these
practitioners’ performance on the Stroop test following presen-
tation of potentially interfering negative emotional images: yoga
practitioners may employ “selective implementation of frontal
executive-dependent strategies to reduce emotional interference
during competing cognitive demands and not during emotional
processing per se.” Further research is needed to determine
whether meditation can enhance capacity for control with regard
to additional sorts of contexts, tasks, and potential distractors.
POSITIVE AFFECT AND THE GOLDILOCKS EFFECT
Proactive measures are not always aimed at potentially deleterious
affect. If we are aware that appropriate emotion would be use-
ful in enhancing thought or action we may try to stimulate that
emotion. Knowing that a blasé attitude is detrimental to cognitive
performance, a student might try to “get psyched” for an exam
(via self-exhortation, perhaps with caffeine supplement). Some
very recent work supports experimentally the familiar notion
that an appropriate level of stress can enhance performance by
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enhancing attentional focus or raising one’s energy level (Minois,
2000). We take this case as representative of the “Goldilocks”
effect, in which cognitive control aims not at suppression, dis-
traction, etc., but at just the right level of affect—not too hot
and not too cold, but just right for cognitive or motor perfor-
mance. We hypothesize that this applies to other sorts of affect
as well (e.g., anger, confidence) and consider the ability to tune
affect by regulation up or down to be an additional area for
future research. One challenge will be to identify specific strate-
gies for modulation of affect, analogous to research on strategies
for the type of cognitive control discussed in section “Reactive
Regulation of Affect and Emotion” above. These tuning or mod-
ulatory strategies would presumably be different than those for
simple suppression, distraction, etc., since their aim is to modify
and make use of affect rather than to eliminate it from conscious-
ness or block its effect. They would also include strategies for both
raising or lowering levels of affect, where agents might well need
different strategies for raising than for lowering, even with regard
to the same type of affect (stress, anger, fear). A key overarch-
ing question will be how this modulation of affect proves helpful
or the opposite: is it a matter of supporting (or interfering with)
desirable levels of attention, energy, or motivation? If so, are there
better, perhaps more direct or more reliable methods for achiev-
ing this? Answering these questions could have large practical
implications.
PRESENT AT THE CREATION: INCULCATION (OR EXTINCTION) OF
INTUITION, HABITS, TRAITS, AND DISPOSITIONS
Not all traits or dispositions to quick responses of a given type
are acquired, and not all acquired ones are acquired through the
deliberate application of cooler processes of planning, training,
etc. But some are, and in particular situations these deliber-
ately acquired or shaped dispositions and habits give rise in turn
to a great many fast, intuitive, or “hot” responses. Thus, slow,
controlled cognitive processes that lead to underlying traits, or
dispositions to a certain type of intuitive response, can have
a large impact at least indirectly on particular intuitive or gut
responses. We suggest that this is the single most important source
of cognitive control of affect and intuition.
We sometimes consciously and on the basis of reflection
decide to alter our own behavioral patterns, as with “New Year’s
Resolutions.” And sometimes we actually follow through. An
extreme example is Benjamin Franklin’s systematic program of
identifying desirable and undesirable habits and personal traits,
then performing actions calculated to inculcate or root them out,
keeping a real-time written record of his relevant actions.
But more often the cooler processes of deciding what habits
and traits we should have, as well as any thinking about how those
habits are to be taught and learned, is done by others. Much of it is
in fact exercised in our “upbringing” and early education in every-
thing from correct table manners and habits of personal hygiene
to virtues such as generosity, honesty, and good citizenship. The
aim is to make these things second nature, so that they have a
“learned naturalness” (Boyer, 1994). When that is achieved, they
issue naturally, and without need for deliberation, in “intuitive”
or “instinctive” judgments and actions when triggered by rele-
vant circumstances. Here cognitive control meets developmental
psychology, educational policy, “parenting,” moral development,
social planning, legislation, law enforcement, and transmission of
culture in general.
The processes of enculturation are numerous and closely inter-
twined. This is where some Social Intuitionists rightly speak of
“immersion in cultural complexes” (Haidt, 2001). Still, we main-
tain that some of the most important aspects of these cultural
complexes consist of slow, controlled cognition in various forms.
To cite just a single important American example, one can point
to the continuing influence of the “wisdom of the Founding
Fathers” as expressed in the Constitution. That document’s ideas
about the basic structure of good government and certain ideals
of citizenship in a democracy have been inculcated continuously
ever since. In part the institutions of inculcation themselves (e.g.,
a system of public education) have been established along lines
long ago deliberated, decided, and even built into our collec-
tive experience by deliberated legislation (e.g., laws requiring a
certain level of schooling) and curriculum decisions (e.g., requir-
ing a course in “civics”). Occasionally substantial changes have
been made to the system (Amendments to the Constitution),
such as extending voting rights beyond white adult males. These
changes, too, have been deliberated and adopted in accordance
with considered procedures set out in the Constitution itself. In
addition, major issues of interpretation have arisen and been set-
tled through deliberation and voting by the Supreme Court (e.g.,
rulings establishing a broad interpretation of “free speech” under
the First Amendment). All these instances of deliberation and
carefully weighed decision-making have had a large impact on
the habits of perception, thought and action of millions of peo-
ple. This is true even for those who have paid little conscious
attention to these processes and would be hard pressed to explain
them coherently. In the present example much of the reason-
ing involved occurred quite a long time ago; but its impact on
our intuitions here and now in the twenty-first century is very
real nonetheless. Again, although it is important to note that our
latter-day judgments are often intuitive, this is only the beginning
of the story, and overlooks important ways in which reasoning
helps shape and control a great many of our affective responses
(e.g., to voter suppression or voter fraud) and intuitive judg-
ments (e.g., about proper political process or the scope of civil
rights).
SOMATIC MARKERS AND ALARM BELLS
Finally, we consider briefly two additional proactive and long-
term sources of gut responses. The first is what Antonio Damasio
calls “somatic markers” (Damasio, 1996). Damasio points out
that many of our decisions, judgments, and actions are at
least constrained by emotionally valenced neural representations
of events and associations implanted by relevant experience.
Once established, they serve to circumscribe the range of viable
responses or decision-making alternatives by nipping the “frame
problem” in the bud. That is, cognitive or behavioral problems
typically can in principle be addressed in an unlimited number
of ways, whereas an agent does not have the time, resources, or
need to investigate them all. Thus, the problemmust be “framed”
so as to limit the possibilities to a manageable field of alterna-
tives. Agents clinically deficient in this regard tend to engage in
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extreme—and exasperatingly extended—processes of delibera-
tion (Damasio, 1996). Somatic markers make normal decision-
making possible by automatically closing off various alternatives
without our having expressly to consider them. At the same time
they can bias one option over another by automatically giving it a
positive or negative valence.
These markers are sometimes distinguished from more
intensely valenced automatic responses, especially aversive ones,
such as disgust or moral repugnance. Greene and colleagues
(Greene et al., 2001; Greene, 2007) relate the difference between
somatic markers and alarm bells to the traditional philosophical
distinction between deontological and utilitarian ethical judg-
ments. Roughly put, deontological judgments are based on spe-
cific and “absolute” rules or principles; e.g., “it is impermissible to
kill an innocent bystander even in order to save five lives, because
murder is always wrong.” Utilitarian judgments allow specific
moral rules to be overridden by considerations of the “greatest
good for the greatest number”; e.g., “it is permissible to kill an
innocent bystander to save five lives, because the overall good
outweighs the harm.” The “Trolley Problem” has been familiar in
philosophy for a few decades and has recently formed the basis
of numerous psychological experiments. We put aside for present
purposes the question of how much the Trolley Problem can tell
us about actual moral choices. In any event there are now many
variants on the problem, but the most basic version is this: You
see a trolley car headed toward a group of five people standing
on the tracks. If you don’t do something the trolley will kill them
all. However, you can throw a switch and divert the trolley onto
a side track, so that it will only kill one person. Do you inter-
vene, or just let things take their course? Most respondents say
it is morally permissible to intervene in order to save the greater
number. Now vary the scenario: you can save the five people only
by directly pushing a large person off a bridge and onto the trol-
ley track. Is it permissible to push him off or not? Most people
say they do not think this permissible. Why is that, if in both
cases it is a matter of sacrificing one person to save five? Some
philosophers and psychologists suggest that the throwing-the-
switch scenario activates only a cooler (i.e., somatic marker based
judgment) utilitarian judgment, whereas the pushing-a-man-off-
the-bridge scenario triggers a basic gut aversion (i.e., alarm bell
response) to harming someone through direct personal action.
Greene and colleagues found that fMRI scans suggest a sys-
tematic neural difference in the type of affective input commonly
linked to these two styles of judgment: deontological-style assess-
ments are commonly driven by alarm bell responses, whereas
utilitarian-style judgments are influenced by relatively more sub-
tle somatic markers (Greene et al., 2001). However, from the
point of view of how reasoning can influence affect/intuition/gut
response, it perhaps goes without saying by now that the main
issues are the extent to which somatic markers and alarm bells
can be implanted deliberately under the control of executive
processes, the extent to which they are open to beneficial modifi-
cation by top–down executive processes, and the like. No doubt
somatic markers and alarm bells are sometimes established by
experience willy-nilly—as when one receives a conk on the noggin
from a playground swing, or an indignant reproof from a proper
young lady (e.g., a slap in the face, if that is not entirely a thing
of the past). But just as with habits, somatic markers and alarm
bells need not be acquired or inculcated thoughtlessly. We suggest
that in fact they are often established as a result of deliberated,
reasoned judgment on the part of others—for example, parents
who give thought to what sort of markers ought to be established
in their children, and to how these markers are to be estab-
lished. Punishment and reward, admonition and encouragement,
censure and praise, succeed in part by deliberately establishing
appropriate somatic markers that help guide future decisions and
actions. If successfully implanted, these markers in turn con-
tribute to the shaping of many intuitive responses in concrete
situations. The obvious parallel with traits or habits is not coin-
cidental, since the selective laying down of somatic markers and
subsequent repeated activation of them is part and parcel of much
of our habit formation.
The same holds for “alarm bells,” even though they may seem
more deeply visceral, inflexible, and perhaps more closely tied to
evolved genetic origins. The example of disgust is a good case in
point. It is one of our loudest alarm bells, and one closely allied
with certain moral responses (see, for example, Nichols, 2004).
Some of our disgust reactions (e.g., to the smell of putrefying
flesh) are evolved, and are extremely resistant to any process of
extinction. But some, including reactions of disgust, fear, etc., are
just as clearly cultural, as with Mary Wollstonecraft’s moral dis-
gust at the sight of “a fine lady clasping a lap dog to her bosom”
(Wollstonecraft, 1792). Behind this intuitive alarm bell of moral
disgust lies a good deal of experience, and reflection on the moral
fatuousness (or worse) of “fine” ladies. Such reflection can help
change the way we conceive a type of person or situation, so as to
trigger an alarm bell that it did not trigger in the past. There was
a time, perhaps, when we admired the fine lady, and intuitively
found it endearing that she clasped her little dog to her bosom.
The neuroscience evidence justmentioned (Greene et al., 2001;
Greene, 2007) does, however, raise one new and important issue.
With regard to types or styles of moral judgment in particular
we would caution against thinking of deontological and util-
itarian approaches as exhaustive alternatives. Moral traits and
habits, including those we label “virtues” and “vices,” constitute
a very important source of moral perceptions, judgments and
actions, and they do not fit easily into a simple deontic/utilitarian
scheme. Moral philosophy has in recent decades seen a resur-
gence of interest in “virtue ethics” as an alternative to deontic
and utilitarian theories of how one is to live a morally good
life. The approach goes back to Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, et al.
A pivotal modern work is Mac Intyre (1984) but there is now a
voluminous literature on the topic. In virtue ethics, virtues and
vices are construed along the general lines of habits or character
traits. Consequently we have strong reservations about framing
psychological or neurological research—or interpreting the data
from such research—in terms of a deontological vs. utilitarian
dichotomy.
As for the use of scanning evidence to support such a
dichotomy, we suggest that although the Trolley Problem may in
fact pose a fairly clear conflict between deontological and utilitar-
ian principles, other sorts of moral judgment do not. Moreover,
in many circumstances the same moral conclusion would be
consistent with both deontological and utilitarian principles.
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For present purposes, however, let it suffice to say that future
research should recognize the option for interpretation afforded
by virtue ethics (and still others would be possible), and consider
carefully how differing responses to given types of experimental
materials might correlate with different underlying bases of moral
judgments. Certainly recognizing the importance of moral traits
and habits opens the door to a great deal of further research, and
to the forging of connections with already established research
on learning, practice, and automatization of moral and other
responses.
CONCLUSION
Our point of departure for a broad consideration of cognitive
control was a particular interpretation of moral judgment as
virtually always intuitive. We conclude that although there is
much truth in this description of such judgments considered
in their immediate context, it is necessary to look beyond that
context when addressing the question of whether and how rea-
soning might potentially influence moral and other intuitions,
or whether rational control in this area is an illusion (Haidt,
2001). A broader perspective reveals numerous ways in which
reasoning can and very often does influence affective response
and intuitive judgment, even if that influence is in many cases
indirect. Much of our discussion, especially that of measures
for proactive control, constitutes a response to the question,
“Where do our intuitive judgments come from?” Putting aside
other factors, we have focused for present purposes on ways in
which reasoning, planning, cognitive monitoring, and the like
play a substantial role in establishing the underlying sources of
intuitive judgments. Chief among these sources are the diverse
habits, traits, skills, expertise, and dispositions that give rise to
fast, automatic, sometimes “hot” responses in particular cir-
cumstances. Of course these sources are not inculcated entirely
through slow, cognitively controlled processes. But many are
acquired or shaped to a significant extent in that way, and this
constitutes a larger field for the control of the fast and hot by
the slow and cool than do the reactive strategies that have up
to now received more attention in the literature on cognitive
control.
In addition there is a great deal of work to be done on related
issues regarding cognitive control: strategies for up-regulation of
affect as well as for suppression, reappraisal, etc.; modulation or
tuning of affect to enhance cognition or action; strategies for
improving or automatizing abilities to apply strategies for modu-
lation or control; and others. These all bear on situations of moral
judgment, but they in fact apply to perception, judgment and
action of all sorts and call for further investigation as important
aspects of the wide and complex domain of cognitive control.
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